Audit Exposes Dead Beneficiaries in Costa Rica’s Social Protection System

A review by Costa Rica’s Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría) has revealed that 2,103 individuals who died before 2024 were still listed as beneficiaries of the Junta de Protección Social (JPS) during 2024 and the first half of 2025. The agency, which channels lottery and gambling profits to private social-service providers, had a beneficiary roll that shrank from 9,510 to 7,407 after the deceased were removed. One case dates back to a person who died in 1984.

The audit found that the JPS, which does not deliver services directly, transferred ₡24,883 million (about US$47 million) across 5,312 payments to 276 private organisations that care for older adults, minors, people with disabilities and those with substance dependency. The presence of deceased beneficiaries made it impossible to confirm who really received the money or whether the transfers served their intended purpose.

The comptroller’s report (DFOE-BIS-RF-00002-2026) also flagged that the JPS failed to report any beneficiary data to the national beneficiary registry (Sinirube) in 2024 and 2025, despite handling that same $47 million in public funds. Moreover, 15 private entities that received ₡2,700 million (about US$5.1 million) never submitted any information about the people they served.

Additional problems included 461 national ID numbers with formatting errors, undermining cross-checks with the electoral tribunal and immigration authority, and ₡21,045 million (US$39.8 million) transferred without proper records in the public budget and planning system (SIPP). The JPS said the observations were administrative rather than about the execution of funds, and that no money went directly to deceased persons; it blamed delays in data updates from the private entities.

How the JPS Accountability Gaps Left Millions Unsupervised

A System Built on Trust, Not Traceability

The JPS acts as a pass-through: it collects revenue from state-run lotteries and games of chance and distributes it to private organisations that deliver care. The audit, however, shows that the institution never built the infrastructure to track who truly benefits. The comptroller noted that the JPS has no presence on the public sector accounts system (SCSP), a platform designed to centralise transactions and improve traceability. Without it, and without mandatory reporting to Sinirube, the flow of nearly $47 million remained largely invisible to the state’s oversight apparatus.

The Dead Beneficiary Problem Is a Symptom, Not the Root

The 2,103 deceased beneficiaries are a stark data point, but the underlying issue is worse: the JPS cannot verify the identity of many living beneficiaries either. The format errors in 461 ID numbers and the lack of synchronization with civil registries mean the system cannot reliably distinguish between real and phantom recipients. This is not just an administrative nuisance — it undermines the entire rationale for publicly financed social transfers, making it impossible to measure effectiveness or detect fraud.

Private Entities Enjoyed Funds Without Scrutiny

The JPS is the largest funder among the 313 organisations in the sample, financing 276 of them. Yet 15 entities received $5.1 million without ever submitting beneficiary data. Under current rules, failure to provide an annual list of beneficiaries can lead to suspension of funding or exclusion from the programme, but the comptroller’s findings suggest enforcement was lax. The JPS says it now accepts the observations and will accelerate its digital transformation and train the organisations in using the national information platforms.

Why This Matters Beyond Costa Rica

The audit highlights a tension common in many countries: governments increasingly delegate social services to private providers but fail to match that delegation with robust monitoring tools. As cash-transfer and voucher programmes expand globally, the Costa Rican case illustrates how the absence of interoperable data systems can leave millions in public money unaccounted for, even when the intent is benign.

What the Findings Mean for Oversight Bodies and Funded Entities

For the Junta de Protección Social:

  • Integrate beneficiary data with Sinirube and the SCSP immediately, as the comptroller’s report explicitly notes the JPS has no accounts registered in the central transaction platform.
  • Require the 15 non-reporting private entities to submit complete beneficiary lists within a fixed deadline; enforce the existing rule that would suspend or exclude them for non-compliance.
  • Automate cross-checks with the civil registry to flag deceased individuals in real time, ending the reliance on periodic data dumps from private entities that created the 1984 case.

For the 276 funded private organisations:

  • Prepare for stricter reporting mandates; the JPS has announced reinforced training and a digital push, so expect to be required to use platforms like SIPP and Sinirube as a condition of continued funding.
  • Audit internal record-keeping systems now — the formatting errors in 461 IDs demonstrate that even well-intentioned providers can fail basic data quality tests.

For oversight bodies in other jurisdictions:

  • Use the Costa Rican audit as a benchmark to verify that delegated social spending is matched by interoperable data feeds into a national beneficiary registry, as the absence of such feeds left $39.8 million in transfers without complete records.

Risk & Opportunity Assessment

Regulatory RiskHighThe comptroller explicitly found that the JPS failed to report beneficiary data to Sinirube in 2024 and 2025, violating the legal obligation tied to the $47 million in transfers. The institution now faces mandatory reforms, and the 15 non-reporting entities risk exclusion or funding suspensions under current programme rules.
Reputation RiskMediumPublic disclosure of deceased beneficiaries undermines trust in the JPS and its private partners. While the JPS claims no funds went to the dead, the audit’s finding of widespread data errors and lack of traceability will damage the reputation of the social protection system, especially given that one case involved a person who died in 1984.
Technology DisruptionLowThe absence of digital dashboards and automated cross-checks is a long-standing shortfall, but the recommended transformation is incremental rather than disruptive. The JPS’s promised acceleration of digital systems suggests a catch-up effort, not a shift in the programme’s fundamental model.
Commercial OpportunityLowThe social protection transfers are not commercial in nature, and the private entities are largely non-profit service providers. There is no material new market opportunity arising from the audit.