Maps, Museums and Manoeuvres: The South China Sea’s Battle of Historical Narratives

A Sea of Stories: How Museums Bolster Territorial Claims

Nearly a decade after the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that China's nine-dash line claims over the South China Sea had no legal basis, the dispute is being fought through history books and museum exhibits as much as by coastguard ships. In the Chinese fishing town of Tanmen, a museum shaped like a boat shows Han Dynasty records of an “ancestral sea” stretching to the Spratly Islands. In Da Nang, Vietnam, a coastal highway and a replica of a French colonial marker commemorate the Paracel Islands – lost to China in a 1974 naval battle. And in Manila, the 1734 Murillo Velarde map, which shows Scarborough Shoal as Philippine territory, is displayed at the National Library.

Each claimant is pouring state resources into entrenching a historical narrative that legitimises its sovereignty. China’s Museum of the South China Sea in Tanmen is being expanded to become one of the country’s largest, presenting court records that Chinese people discovered the islands “no later than the 2nd century BC”. Vietnam’s Hoang Sa Exhibition Hall showcases documents from the 17th century when Nguyen lords sent militia teams to survey the islands and erect sovereignty markers. Such institutions are not just for tourists; they are integrated into school curricula, shaping public sentiment and hardening national positions.

The contemporary front line is equally active. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, the Philippines has abandoned the accommodationist stance of his predecessor and has instead pursued “assertive transparency” – embedding journalists on vessels to film China’s use of water cannon and lasers. A June 2026 survey found that 86% of Filipinos support defending their claims. Vietnam, meanwhile, has opted for quiet diplomacy while aggressively reclaiming land in the Spratly Islands: an additional 2.16 sq km in the past year alone, bringing its total reclaimed area to roughly 11.2 sq km. China has responded with a major new reclamation campaign at Antelope Reef in the Paracels, creating about 6 sq km of new artificial land.

These manoeuvres occur in waters that carry about one-third of global maritime trade, and the recent temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 was a sharp reminder of the vulnerability of such sea lanes. The question is whether the claimant states will ever prioritise regional stability over their rival historical narratives.

Why the Past Is Now a Weapon in the South China Sea

Historical Claims as an Instrument of State Power

The museums and ancient maps do legal and emotional work that no white paper can achieve alone. By appealing to a continuous national presence stretching back centuries, they aim to create a fact on the ground outside the reach of international tribunals. For China, the Tanmen narrative is especially potent: it transforms fishermen’s generations-old practice into a living testament of sovereignty, a story that President Xi Jinping personally reinforced with his 2013 visit. For Vietnam, the Paracel exhibition and the naming of Hoang Sa Road embed loss and defiance into urban identity. These efforts are effective at the domestic level but also serve as signals to the international community that compromise is politically costly.

The Philippines’ High-Risk Gamble

Marcos’s pivot has brought undeniable gains in international awareness and US military access under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement. By publicising Chinese grey-zone tactics, Manila has built diplomatic pressure, but it has also raised the cost of any face-saving compromise, making even minor incidents harder to de-escalate. The June 2026 ban on Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr and his family from entering China shows how personal and direct the confrontation has become. With public opinion overwhelmingly behind a hard line, Manila is locked in a cycle of escalation that leaves little room for quiet diplomacy.

Vietnam’s Two-Faced Strategy

Hanoi has chosen a path that appears contradictory but is internally consistent. Communist Party chief To Lam’s April 2026 state visit to China and the signing of 32 cooperation agreements, including on railways and AI, underscore Vietnam’s deep economic integration with its northern neighbour – a dependency that makes it vulnerable to coercion. Yet at the same time, Vietnam is rapidly building up its physical footprint in the Spratlys, creating fortified logistical hubs and effectively matching China’s island-building. Researcher Dinh Kim Phuc notes that Vietnam avoids publicising incidents to prevent an outcry that could force an escalation it cannot afford. The result is a dual policy: economic entanglement as shield, land reclamation as silent sword.

What History Cannot Settle

The competing ancestral narratives are, by their nature, irreconcilable. No museum or 18th-century map can adjudicate between overlapping claims that predate modern international law. Yet they serve to raise the domestic political stakes to a point where any concession feels like a betrayal. As grey-zone tactics – blockades, ramming, reclamation – become the norm, the risk of an unintended military clash rises. The 2026 Hormuz disruption underlines how quickly a chokepoint can go from tense to closed, and the South China Sea is far more critical to global supply chains.

What Regional Players and Businesses Must Watch

For regional governments and policymakers:

• Balance alliance signalling with back-channel de-escalation. The Philippines’ assertive transparency has won support but also narrows diplomatic exits. Vietnam’s quiet reclamation while deepening economic ties with China shows an alternative, though risky, path.
• Invest in multilateral crisis-communication protocols. Without reliable hotlines and rules of engagement, a collision between coastguard vessels could escalate quickly. The 2026 Hormuz incident demonstrated how one flashpoint can trigger global supply-chain panic.

For businesses relying on South China Sea transit or with regional supply chains:

• Assess exposure to the sea lane and consider inventory buffers. About one-third of global maritime trade uses these waters. Even a partial disruption would spike shipping insurance and freight rates – the Hormuz precedent saw premiums jump 150% within days.
• Monitor Chinese-Vietnamese economic integration for potential leverage points. Vietnam’s dependence on Chinese trade and infrastructure financing means any business with joint ventures or suppliers in either country should stress-test scenarios of economic coercion or sanctions.
• Track island-building activity. China’s new 6 sq km reclamation at Antelope Reef and Vietnam’s ongoing build-up may signal further militarisation; any future incident near these outposts could freeze transit in contested zones.