Maritime Pine Monoculture Faces Adaptation Pressure After Gironde Wildfires

A new megafire in Gironde reignites the debate over maritime pine monoculture

The massive wildfire that scorched 42,000 hectares near Saumos in Gironde this July started along a freshly replanted parcel of young maritime pines — the very same species that already burned in the 2022 megafires. The blaze has thrust the intensive monoculture of the Landes de Gascogne forest back into the spotlight. This vast planted woodland, stretching across a million hectares in southwestern France, was created in the 19th century to drain a sandy, marshy landscape and is now dominated by a single tree: maritime pine accounts for 70–75 % of the standing timber.

Critics point to the tree’s resinous nature and the thick layer of dry needles and gorse on the forest floor, arguing that this monoculture turns the massif into a tinderbox. Yet researchers and industry figures push back. Sylvain Delzon, a plant ecophysiologist at the University of Bordeaux, says mature pines over 25 years old – reaching 20 metres in height – are relatively fire-resistant. Anne Guivar’ch, director general of the interprofessional body FIBNA, describes maritime pine as the species best adapted to the region’s poor sandy soils and insists “there really isn’t a Plan B”. The pine remains the preferred species for structural timber, the most profitable forest product.

Bruno Lafon, mayor of Biganos and president of the Gironde fire defence organisation DFCI, acknowledges that past fire prevention efforts have not always been sufficient. His body already levies a mandatory contribution from forest owners to fund fire breaks and water reserves, but the repeated infernos are straining that model.

Why replacing the maritime pine is not an option for Landes’ timber economy

The fire dynamics of a pine monoculture

Young maritime pine stands burn readily — the 2026 fire ignited next to a replanted plot whose trees were only a few years old. The species’ resin and the accumulation of dry litter create ideal conditions for fast-spreading flames. Yet the risk is not uniform: older, taller individuals often survive low-intensity fires, meaning that a blanket condemnation of the species misses much of the picture. The debate is less about the tree itself than about how it is planted and managed.

Why the industry insists there is no “Plan B”

The Landes forest sits on deep, acidic sands that very few commercial timber species tolerate. Alternatives such as oak or birch grow far slower, yield less valuable timber, and would require a complete overhaul of the local processing chains. For the sawmills, panels and pulp plants clustered in the region, maritime pine is not just a crop but the foundation of a vertically integrated supply chain. This economic lock-in makes wholesale diversification economically unviable for the thousands of small private forest owners who manage most of the land.

Climate stress and urban pressure reshape the risk calculus

Fires are becoming more frequent and more severe as summers grow hotter and drier. At the same time, creeping urbanisation places housing closer to wooded areas, raising the human and financial stakes. The DFCI’s fire prevention levy, while a step forward, was designed for a lower-intensity fire regime and is already struggling to keep pace. Without additional public and private investment, the monoculture model will face ever-higher damage bills and, potentially, an insurance crisis for forest assets.

For forest owners and insurers: practical steps after two infernos in four years

• When restoring burned parcels, break the continuity. The 2026 fire began next to a dense, even-aged pine replanting. On parcels that have now burned twice, forest owners should integrate fire-resistant deciduous strips or widen clearings, even if pine remains the main commercial crop.
• Insurers should grade risk by plantation age and density. Modelling shows that young, tightly spaced pines accelerate fire spread. Incorporating these management factors into underwriting could price in the real fire hazard and incentivize safer replanting practices.
• Fast-track the DFCI’s infrastructure programme. The existing levy finances fire breaks and water tanks, but Bruno Lafon’s own admission that “not everything has been done perfectly” suggests the network is insufficient. Local authorities should use the 2026 disaster to unlock additional funding from national and European climate-adaptation budgets for heavier-duty prevention works.