Trump Admin Ready to Grant Saudi Arabia Uranium Enrichment Rights, Bypassing IAEA Oversight

A Nuclear Deal on Trump’s Desk

President Donald Trump has on his desk a draft nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that would grant Riyadh the right to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel, while forgoing the invasive inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol. The terms, leaked to US media and confirmed by sources cited by Russia’s Kommersant, represent a historic departure from Washington’s decades-long policy of tying civil nuclear cooperation to strict nonproliferation commitments.

Under the typical US ‘123 agreements’, partner states were required to renounce enrichment and reprocessing and to allow the IAEA expanded access to verify that no military nuclear work was under way. The new draft, reportedly finalised in October 2025, drops both conditions. Instead, the United States would rely on bilateral monitoring arrangements to keep Saudi nuclear activities in check—an approach American nonproliferation experts have long deemed inadequate.

The agreement is widely seen as a commercial gambit. Saudi Arabia wants to build up to 16 nuclear reactors to meet growing electricity demand and to diversify away from oil under its Vision 2030 plan. US firms, competing with Russian and Chinese state vendors for the multibillion-dollar contracts, have argued that Washington’s rigid conditions cost them deals. By relaxing those rules, the White House hopes to lock in a long-term nuclear partnership with the kingdom.

The timing is delicate: the United States is simultaneously waging a war against Iran, in part to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. Offering Saudi Arabia enrichment rights while bombing Iran over the same capability has already drawn bipartisan concern on Capitol Hill and sharp criticism from arms-control advocates.

Why Washington Is Abandoning Its ‘Gold Standard’ on Nonproliferation

The Erosion of the ‘Gold Standard’

The US had long prided itself on demanding the world’s toughest nonproliferation conditions for civil nuclear trade. The 123 agreement template, mandated by the Atomic Energy Act, required partners to forgo sensitive fuel-cycle technology and to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol. The new Saudi deal abandons that standard entirely. For the first time, a US administration is willing to accept a partner’s right to a full nuclear fuel cycle without independent international verification, substituting it with a bilateral mechanism whose details remain secret.

Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Calculus

Riyadh has been openly shopping for nuclear power vendors for more than a decade. Its ambitions are driven by soaring electricity consumption, the prestige of owning a complete fuel cycle, and the desire for an alternative income stream as the world moves beyond oil. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has repeatedly stated that the kingdom will pursue nuclear weapons if Iran acquires them. While experts quoted by Kommersant argue that the risk of reputational damage, economic sanctions and the collapse of foreign investment under Vision 2030 would likely deter Saudi Arabia from actually weaponising, the mere availability of enrichment technology under a purely bilateral oversight arrangement weakens the global nonproliferation architecture.

The Geopolitical Domino Effect

Consultant Leonid Tsukanov from the PIR Center warns that Saudi acquisition of a latent nuclear weapons capability would almost certainly trigger a cascade of similar ambitions across the Middle East. Iran’s program would be further emboldened; Turkey, the UAE and Egypt would also demand equal treatment. The region’s deep mutual suspicion—rooted in a long history of conflict—means that mere defensive assurances would not assuage rivals. Consequently, Washington’s move could inadvertently accelerate a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race at a time when US-Iran tensions are already at a boiling point.

Russia and China’s Relative Flexibility

Russia and China have never made the IAEA Additional Protocol a precondition for reactor deals, though Moscow publicly supports its universalisation. Rosatom has built or is building plants in numerous countries, but only Egypt has not yet signed the Protocol among them, and it still cooperates actively with the IAEA. The US shift now aligns Washington’s offer more closely with what Russia and China have already been willing to provide, intensifying the commercial race while diminishing America’s moral authority on nonproliferation.

What the Shift Means for Business, Diplomacy and Regional Stability

• US nuclear vendors: Westinghouse and other companies may finally be able to compete for Saudi contracts, but they must brace for potential congressional roadblocks. A statutory review of the 123 agreement could be triggered if lawmakers object to the absence of enrichment-reprocessing bans, threatening the deal’s legal footing.
• Saudi Vision 2030 planners: Securing a reliable nuclear energy partner is critical, but the kingdom should build robust transparency measures into any bilateral monitoring framework to avoid alienating international investors who fear sanctions exposure if the program drifts toward military use.
• Regional governments (UAE, Turkey, Egypt, Iran): The US-Saudi deal will be cited as a precedent in future nuclear negotiations. These states should expect heightened scrutiny from the IAEA and the international community, and may face tougher conditions from suppliers who seek to avoid a competitive race to the bottom on safeguards.
• Global nonproliferation advocates and Congress: This agreement hands a powerful argument to proponents of the Iran war and may weaken the IAEA’s authority. US lawmakers will likely seek hearings and could attempt to block the deal unless the Additional Protocol or equivalent legally binding inspections are included.