Trump Memo Pushes Steam Carrier Reversal and Foreign-Owned US Yards

Inside the 13 August White House Memo to Rebuild US Naval Shipbuilding

On 13 August, President Trump signed a presidential memorandum setting out a broad programme to revive US naval shipbuilding and sustainment. The document identifies a lack of shipbuilding capacity and competition, large order backlogs across six major Navy programmes, an uncompetitive commercial shipbuilding sector, and an atrophied maritime industrial base as the core problems. The Department of Defense has been tasked with restoring capacity and competition, with an explicit preference for proven, reliable and affordable technology and designs.

The most immediate technical decision concerns CVN-81, the future USS Doris Miller. Within 60 days, the Department of Defense must produce a plan to replace the Ford-class ship's Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators with steam and hydraulic systems, including timelines and resourcing. Because the carrier is already under construction and EMALS long-lead items have been acquired for future Ford-class ships, the change could require structural and subsystem rework. The wider effect on the carrier fleet is not yet determined.

The memorandum also expands the so-called Finland Model beyond the icebreaker programme to as many as three ship classes. A foreign supplier may build the first two ships of a class outside the United States if it builds a new US yard or takes majority ownership of an existing US-based yard, hires and trains an American workforce, licenses proprietary shipbuilding technology to US yards, and creates a US supply chain. The package also bars iterative design changes to mature parent designs without senior approval, directs a new competitive acquisition approach for surface combatants, and orders planning for a fifth public shipyard with up to three submarine-capable drydocks in locations including the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii and US territories.

What the 60-Day Carrier Order, Foreign Yard Rule and Design-Change Ban Actually Change

The CVN-81 Reversal Puts a Signature Technology on Notice

The order to plan steam and hydraulic systems for CVN-81 is a direct challenge to General Atomics' EMALS and the Ford-class programme's electric architecture. The memo's stated preference for proven, reliable and affordable technologies suggests the administration views the mature Nimitz-class steam catapult approach as lower execution risk, even if installing it in a Ford-class hull late in build could be costly. What is fact is the 60-day planning order; what is interpretation is that this may strand existing EMALS long-lead purchases and reduce the system's future across the carrier fleet.

The Finland Model Is a Market-Entry Path With Binding Conditions

The foreign ownership provisions are not an unrestricted invitation. A foreign builder can only secure the right to build the first two ships abroad by establishing or majority-owning a US yard, employing and training American workers, licensing proprietary techniques, and building a US supply chain. Those terms make the model a structured capacity transfer. South Korea's Hanwha, which has a conditional bid for Austal's US division, and Rheinmetall, which acquired NVL in March 2026 and has floated a GMF 140 frigate concept for an unnamed North American opportunity, are the most obvious potential entrants named in the coverage.

The Design-Change Ban Is a Constellation-Class Correction

The memorandum explicitly stops the US Navy from imposing iterative design changes on mature parent designs without senior approval. That is a direct response to the Constellation-class frigate programme, which began from the mature FREMM design, was repeatedly altered, fell over budget and late, and was ultimately reduced to two ships before the FFG(X) programme was cancelled in late 2025. The new rule reduces programme manager flexibility in exchange for preserving the cost and schedule advantages of proven designs.

A Fifth Public Yard Is a Long-Term Submarine Capacity Play

The instruction to plan a fifth public shipyard with up to three new drydocks is aimed at nuclear-powered submarine and aircraft carrier readiness, with site options near the Pacific Fleet. That aligns with the planned growth of the fast attack submarine fleet over two decades. The measure is strategically significant but structurally slow: site selection, funding, design and construction would take years, so it does not relieve near-term maintenance and new-build backlogs in the six programmes the memo itself identifies.

Next Moves for Shipbuilders, Suppliers and Foreign Primes Under the Memo

• CVN-81 programme managers and NAVSEA: Treat the 60-day steam and hydraulic conversion plan as an immediate acquisition gate; the memo requires timelines and resource data, so current EMALS and Advanced Weapons Elevator work on CVN-81 should not be assumed to continue unchanged.
• General Atomics and EMALS/AWE suppliers: Expect re-scoping or cancellation of long-lead items tied to CVN-81 and later Ford-class ships, because the carrier now in build has been directed away from those systems.
• Foreign naval primes such as Hanwha and Rheinmetall: Structure US market bids around the Finland Model's conditions — majority ownership of a US yard or a new US yard, American hiring and training, licensed proprietary technology, and a US supply chain — rather than a simple export of hulls.
• US shipyards and surface combatant suppliers: Prepare to compete under the new anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare and convoy escort acquisition approach; incumbent status under the previous frigate structure does not carry over.
• Pacific-facing states and territories: Expect planning interest for the fifth public shipyard's up to three submarine-capable drydocks in the continental US, Alaska, Hawaii and US territories, though appropriations and final site selection remain later steps.