Global Youth Unemployment Rises Again as Post-Pandemic Jobs Recovery Stalls

The ILO’s 2025 Youth Jobs Report: The Post-Pandemic Recovery Has Stalled

The long global improvement in youth unemployment after the pandemic has stopped, according to the International Labour Organization. By the end of 2025, 67 million people under the age of 25 were looking for work, equivalent to 12.4% of the economically active population in that age group. The rate had fallen from more than 15% in 2020 to 12.3% in 2023, but it has since stabilised and begun to edge upward.

The ILO report also records a rise in the share of young people who are neither working nor studying. That figure increased by 0.3 percentage points to 20%, covering 257 million people. The contrast with older workers is stark: average unemployment for people over 25 was only 3.6% in 2025. For the ILO, the widening gap suggests the global economy is becoming less effective at absorbing people just entering the labour market.

Regional differences are large. Arab states had the highest youth unemployment at 26.2%, followed by North Africa at 22.6% and Northern, Southern and Western Europe at 15%. The lowest rates were recorded in sub-Saharan Africa at 8.4%, Southeast Asia and Oceania at 9.5%, and North America at 9.8%. But the fastest increases are not all where the levels are highest: North Africa rose by 1.8 percentage points, North America by 1.6 points, and Northern, Southern and Western Europe by 0.8 points. In the last two years, 105 countries recorded rising youth unemployment, while only 58 recorded a fall.

The ILO points to two forces. First, job creation has been too slow in regions where the youth population is expanding. Second, artificial intelligence is beginning to reshape entry-level work: 6.1% of jobs held by people aged 15 to 29 are in categories most exposed to AI and therefore at risk of disappearing. In Russia, total unemployment is historically low at 2.2%, but the share of young people among all jobseekers has risen from 17.3% to 22% over five years, to 353,000 people. The report suggests this may reflect earlier entry into the labour market through internships and work placements rather than a genuine rise in youth unemployment.

Why 67 Million Under-25 Jobseekers Are Losing Ground Again

The end of the post-pandemic catch-up

The movement from above 15% in 2020 to 12.3% in 2023 looked like a recovery: after the pandemic shock, many young people who had lost jobs or delayed job searches returned to work. The 2025 number of 12.4% breaks that pattern. It is not a severe deterioration, but it suggests the recovery phase is over and the underlying structural problem has become visible again. With adult unemployment at 3.6%, the youth rate is more than three times higher, an unusually wide gap that indicates entry-level hiring is not expanding fast enough.

AI is reshaping the entry-level contract

The ILO’s estimate that 6.1% of jobs held by 15–29-year-olds are in categories highly exposed to AI does not mean 6.1% of young workers are about to lose their jobs. It identifies the share of current youth-held roles where automation risk is highest. In developed economies, this is likely to operate through more selective hiring, fewer junior positions, or changes in what entry-level roles require. That matters because AI exposure is entering the youth labour market when the post-pandemic hiring impulse is already fading.

North America and Europe: low levels, faster deterioration

One of the more striking details is that North America has a comparatively low youth unemployment rate of 9.8%, but it recorded the second-largest increase, up 1.6 percentage points. Northern, Southern and Western Europe also rose by 0.8 points to 15%. This pattern suggests the cooling is not confined to emerging economies with underlying demographic pressure; it is also visible in wealthy labour markets where young people are typically better educated and more connected to digital work. North Africa, with the largest increase of 1.8 points, shows the demographic side of the problem more forcefully.

The Russia figure is probably a different story

The Russian data needs careful reading. Total unemployment is at an all-time low of 2.2%, yet the youth share of jobseekers has climbed to 22%. That combination is unusual. The analysis suggests the main driver is earlier labour-market entry: more teenagers and students are taking internships, apprenticeships and practical placements, which moves them into the measured jobseeker pool. If true, this is not the same problem as young people being shut out of work; it is a change in when entry begins. The quality of those early placements remains the key unknown.

Labor Market Strategy After the ILO’s Youth Unemployment Warning

The ILO’s 2025 data gives a working agenda for three groups: policy teams concerned with youth detachment, employers planning entry-level hiring, and young people choosing where and when to enter the labour market.

• For policymakers in countries where youth unemployment is rising: use the 105-versus-58 country split not just as a headline but as a diagnostic. Where the NEET rate is rising at the same time as registered unemployment, as in the ILO’s 0.3-point global NEET increase, education and labour programmes need to target people who are neither working nor studying, not only registered jobseekers.
• For employers in North America and Europe: the post-pandemic entry-level hiring recovery has faded. With youth unemployment up 1.6 points in North America and 0.8 points in Northern, Southern and Western Europe, structured early hiring, internships and apprenticeship tracks become more important than waiting for a large pool of traditional graduates.
• For companies in AI-exposed sectors: the ILO’s 6.1% figure covers jobs held by 15–29-year-olds that are most vulnerable to automation. Instead of cutting junior roles, map which of those roles can be redesigned into transition jobs that combine automation with human supervision, because the entry-level pipeline is already narrowing in developed markets.
• For young entrants in high-unemployment regions: in Arab states at 26.2% and North Africa at 22.6%, the opportunity cost of being outside work and education is especially high; in North America and Europe, early structured work experience matters more because entry-level hiring is becoming more selective. The Russian case, where the youth share of jobseekers reached 22% while total unemployment stayed near record lows, shows earlier entry through placements can be a structural feature rather than a warning.
• For investors and workforce planners: the ILO’s rising NEET rate and 67 million young jobseekers should temper assumptions about young-adult consumption and household formation in the most affected regions, while creating potential demand for retraining and active labour-market services if governments respond.