Is a New Global Financial Map Forming? IMEMO’s Vladimir Milovidov on Gold, the Dollar and Sanctions

The Milovidov Interview: A New Financial Map in the Making

Interfax Business has published the second part of a conversation between political observer Vyacheslav Terekhov and Vladimir Milovidov, deputy director of the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations. The discussion examines whether the world is moving toward a new financial map, prompted by China's reported movement of gold reserves into Hong Kong and the Western freeze of Russian currency reserves.

Milovidov argues that China's actions are both a strategic response to the Russian asset freeze and part of a longer effort to reduce financial dependence on the dollar. China is, in his description, the world's largest trading power and manufacturing hub, but it remains more exposed to dollar-based financial markets than its industrial weight would suggest. That dependence became particularly visible after 2008, when China's financial recovery lagged the United States. US financial crises, he says, travel globally through the dollar system and tend to reinforce American influence.

On fragmentation, Milovidov warns against exaggerating the trend. Europe's financial market is deeply tied to the United States, and he points to Euroclear, where Russian assets are frozen, as an example: the depositary holds securities belonging to many American investors. That may explain why the EU has struggled to confiscate the frozen assets, since such a move could trigger legal claims and losses for American investors. At the same time, regional payment systems in national currencies are being developed by China, discussed within BRICS, proposed by South Africa, and used in crypto-based settlement channels for Russia's trade with friendly countries.

For Russia, Milovidov describes a flexible position. Moscow has shifted toward national-currency settlements, stopped investing in foreign bonds as a reserve instrument, and accumulated gold through the central bank. Russia's advantage, he argues, is that it has physical goods the world needs: hydrocarbons, agricultural products, fertilisers, metals and military equipment. His conclusion is that a new architecture of the global monetary and financial system is taking shape, even if the process is gradual and uneven.

Why the Dollar Still Dominates—and Where the Real Shift Is

Why the Dollar Has Not Lost Its Anchor

Milovidov's most cautionary point is that de-dollarization is not a clean break. Europe, he argues, is too integrated with US financial infrastructure to form a genuinely independent zone. The Euroclear example is specific: American investors hold paper through the depositary, so action against frozen Russian assets could expose them to litigation and financial losses. This creates a political and legal constraint that preserves the dollar-centred system even as alternative rails appear.

This matters because it separates the rhetorical shift from the operational shift. New payment systems are being built, but the existing settlement, custody and legal architecture still favours the dollar. A rupture, if it comes, would be costly to both sides.

China's Gold and the Taiwan Question

The interview frames China's gold moves as linked to the freeze of Russian reserves and to possible future pressure over Taiwan. Gold, in this view, is the neutral asset that can support the yuan without requiring trust in Western financial infrastructure. Milovidov avoids presenting this as a sudden policy turn; he describes China's steps as cautious and extended over time. The strategic logic is clear: reduce the financial vulnerability that comes from dollar-dependence while maintaining access to global markets.

This is consistent with Beijing's broader behaviour: accumulating gold, building domestic and regional payment infrastructure, and keeping its options open rather than forcing a collision with the dollar system.

Russia's Commodity-Backed Flexibility

Milovidov's account of Russia's position is less about financial innovation and more about underlying economic leverage. Russia has stopped treating foreign bonds as a reserve instrument, uses national currencies in trade, and has a central bank that has actively accumulated gold. Sanctions constrain access to Western finance, but Russia's real advantage, in his telling, is the physical export base: energy, agriculture, fertilisers, metals and arms.

That distinction matters. A country with hard-currency financial assets is vulnerable to them being frozen; a country with physical goods can still trade, even if settlement channels are more complex. The move toward crypto and gold-based alliances with friendly countries is therefore presented as a practical adaptation rather than an ideological rejection of the dollar.

What the Interview Leaves Unsettled

The conversation is analytical, not a disclosure of new policy. It does not provide data on the size or timing of China's Hong Kong gold holdings, nor does it confirm that BRICS or African settlement proposals will become operational. The strongest claim is directional: fragmentation is happening, but the dollar remains the dominant international currency for now. Investors and policymakers should treat that as a baseline, not a forecast of imminent collapse.

What the Gold and Reserve Shift Means for Businesses and Investors

For businesses and investors with exposure to currency, gold or Russia-China trade corridors, the interview offers several concrete filters.

• For firms trading with Russia or China: Assess whether existing dollar clearing routes still cover the relevant corridors, and whether national-currency or crypto settlement channels named in the interview—such as BRICS proposals, China's system or Russia's arrangements with friendly countries—have reached operational readiness for your counterparties.
• For gold market participants: Treat China's gradual accumulation and Russia's central-bank gold buying as a structural demand signal, not a temporary trade. The interview explicitly links gold to reserve diversification and yuan support.
• For asset managers and banks exposed to Euroclear: Factor in the argument that confiscation of frozen Russian assets is constrained by the presence of American investor holdings. Legal and financial exposure could crystallise if that balance changes.
• For emerging-market and commodity-exposed businesses: Distinguish between announced regional settlement systems and operating ones. The interview suggests direction is clear, but scale and timing remain uncertain.