University Presidents Distance Themselves From Helping the Trump Administration Draft Its Higher-Ed Vision

How a Letter About ‘Intellectual Pluralism’ Pulled University Presidents Into a Political Firestorm

The Department of Education’s letter on Monday—laying out seven principles for every U.S. postsecondary institution—immediately became a flashpoint for two reasons. First, it was seen as the Trump administration’s attempt to get college presidents to sign onto a sweeping vision for the sector. Second, and more explosive for many faculty members, several prominent higher-ed leaders were reported to have helped draft it.

Bloomberg initially named the Association of American Universities as the primary partner, with Douglas A. Girod, chancellor of the University of Kansas, playing a major role. The reaction from the academic community was swift and fierce. Dominique J. Baker, an education policy professor at the University of Delaware, said the AAU had “offer[ed] higher ed up for political repression on a silver platter.” Ronald M. Barrett-Gonzalez, a KU aerospace engineering professor, said the very idea caused “great consternation to the KU faculty.” The national American Association of University Professors called it “an unconscionable dereliction of duty.”

Yet the letter itself—sometimes called “Compact 2.0” in reference to a more aggressive document from last year—does not prescribe specific policies or tie federal money directly to compliance. Even so, with the administration having spent the last year and a half cutting university research funding, threatening visa surcharges, and insulting colleges, many simply do not trust it. In the days since the letter’s release, the named leaders have scrambled to play down their parts, while often still saying their institutions will answer the questions it raises.

Andrew D. Martin, chancellor of Washington University in St. Louis, issued a statement saying he had participated in “broader discussions” but was “not involved … in the drafting of the letter.” Barbara R. Snyder, AAU president, gave a detailed account of a tightly controlled feedback process, while a University of Kansas spokesperson said Girod believed it was important that universities help shape the document. Arizona State University president Michael M. Crow, also named, sent a statement supportive of colleges responding but did not answer whether he was a drafter.

The High-Stakes Balancing Act Behind the AAU’s Closed-Door Feedback

The dust-up exposes a fundamental tension for research universities: when cooperation with a hostile administration can be painted as capitulation, even modest engagement becomes a reputational liability.

The AAU’s Controlled Feedback and Its Limits

In an interview, Snyder described a process that gave AAU representatives little control. She, Girod, and Johns Hopkins president Ronald J. Daniels—the AAU’s board chair and vice chair—met with Education Department and White House officials two or three times in person and a couple of times over the phone. They saw drafts only during the meetings and were never given copies. Snyder said the first draft they saw was already quite different from the earlier Compact for Academic Excellence, and the final version was significantly changed. “Did they listen to some of our suggestions? Yes. Did they take all of our suggestions? No,” she said. That framing—that AAU participants were essentially commenters rather than co-authors—is crucial to the group’s defense, but it does not completely shield them from the faculty criticism that any dialogue with this administration legitimizes its approach.

Why the Distinction Between Drafting and Discussing Matters

University presidents know that the optics of helping write a document that includes principles like “merit” and “intellectual pluralism”—terms the administration could later weaponize—are perilous. By stating they did not draft the letter, leaders like Martin and Girod try to signal that they are not endorsing the administration’s broader agenda. At the same time, their institutions are legally and financially exposed. The AAU has sued the government multiple times over research funding cuts and a proposed $100,000 visa fee, and Snyder argues that dialogue is a realistic complement to litigation. The calculated bet is that the letter’s questions, however problematic, can be answered in a way that showcases universities’ existing commitments without ceding institutional autonomy.

A Split Within the Academy

The AAUP is urging colleges not to respond at all, calling the letter a tool that will be used to impose political orthodoxy. But not every faculty member shares that hard line. Tobias Marriage, an astronomer at Johns Hopkins, pointed to similarities between the letter’s themes and an AAU mission statement published in April that included merit, affordability, and free expression. He said he wasn’t surprised that leaders played a role, and he expressed sympathy for presidents trying to “manage the risks” in a difficult moment. That diversity of opinion inside the faculty itself complicates any single narrative about betrayal or necessity.

What Comes Next for Leaders Who Engaged—and Those Who Did Not

For university leaders and boards who must decide how to handle the letter—and future administration overtures—several specific dynamics from this episode provide immediate guidance.

• If you engage, clarify the bounds—and the paper trail. Snyder’s description of sessions without retained drafts sets a precedent for future interactions. Any university that chooses to offer feedback on a draft should insist on keeping copies of all versions shown, or at minimum issue a contemporaneous written summary, to avoid exactly the dispute now playing out over who wrote what.
• Shared governance cannot be an afterthought. Girod’s planned “collaborative process” to write answers is a direct response to faculty outrage. As KU professor Barrett-Gonzalez’s comment shows, even the perception that a president acted alone can poison campus relations. Boards should require—and presidents should welcome—meaningful faculty and senate input before any formal response goes to the Education Department.
• Expect the administration to cite these answers later. Though the letter does not attach financial penalties today, the earlier Compact for Academic Excellence explicitly threatened to pull federal support. If universities answer and the administration later ties funds to “merit” or “intellectual pluralism” as it defines them, those answers could be used as endorsements. Legal and communications teams should prepare for that possibility, including by drafting statements that explicitly note where a university’s interpretation differs from the administration’s apparent intent.
• AAUP’s call for non-response is not just faculty rhetoric—it could shape bargaining positions. The national AAUP’s statement that “the best path forward is for higher-education workers to organize and demand that their administrations and governing boards reject Compact 2.0” signals that faculty may withhold cooperation on other fronts if presidents appear too accommodating. Presidents facing unionized faculties should factor this into their calculations.