The Column’s Core Argument

A blistering opinion column published by Larepublica on 26 July 2026 describes former president Álvaro Uribe as a statesman whose principles are “not for sale,” while accusing the entire political class—from his successor Juan Manuel Santos to the current incoming government and the opposition—of corruption, incompetence and betrayal of the 2016 peace referendum’s “No” vote.

The author, writing under the headline “Todos contra el capitán del barco” (Everyone against the captain of the ship), portrays Uribe as the victim of a relentless campaign by elites and media envious of his popularity. It claims the former president was unjustly placed under house arrest and that successive governments and congress failed to restore “full legality” after Santos imposed the peace accord through corruption, bypassing the popular will.

The column asserts that recent elections were a shameful “reality show” where forty movements and alliances, none fit to run a business, competed solely to attack Uribe or imitate him. It argues that the country was saved “by a fluke” from a narco-communist takeover led by Gustavo Petro—identified as the heir of the FARC and other armed groups—only because the electoral authority resisted pressure and because Petro’s mediocrity squandered his advantage.

The piece concludes with a bleak outlook, questioning whether Colombia can ever return to legality while the “political show of illegals” continues, fueled by narco-dollars and widespread corruption.

The Political Fault Lines the Piece Exposes

The column is not an isolated outburst. Its publication in a mainstream outlet signals the persistence of a deeply polarised narrative around the 2016 peace process and the legal treatment of Uribe. Several historical facts underpin the fury, though the author’s interpretation is fiercely partisan.

What Actually Happened with the 2016 Referendum and the JEP

In October 2016, voters rejected the original peace deal with the FARC in a binding plebiscite. The government renegotiated and, through a legislative shortcut, ratified a revised text without a second popular vote. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) was subsequently created to prosecute war crimes—a body the column calls an illegal imposition. Those events remain a live political wound, and the author’s claim that the Santos administration bought votes (“mermelada”) is an accusation that has never been proven in court.

Uribe’s Legal Situation

Álvaro Uribe was placed under house arrest in 2020 in a witness-tampering and fraud case, later released but still facing investigation. His supporters view the prosecution as political persecution; his detractors see it as a legitimate judicial proceeding. The column’s framing that Uribe alone paid the price while “the corrupt” went free reflects this grievance, but omits that several high-profile politicians and former guerrillas have also faced trial under the JEP and ordinary justice.

The Anti-System Charge Against Petro

Gustavo Petro, president since 2022, is routinely labelled by critics as a former M-19 guerrilla who threatens social freedoms. The column’s claim that the 2026 elections could have delivered “narco-communism” co-opts a longstanding rhetorical device. In practice, official indices show democratic institutions have continued to function, albeit under intense strain and with severe citizen dissatisfaction.

Institutional Failures the Author Identifies

The piece usefully catalogs a sentiment that the three branches of government, oversight bodies, and major parties all fell short in enforcing the rule of law after 2016. This chimes with public opinion surveys showing deep distrust in congress, the judiciary and political organisations. Yet the solution it hints at—a return to Uribe-style leadership—is itself a polarising proposition, given the security forces’ conduct during his presidency, which remains the subject of international scrutiny.