Why the EU Dropped Usmanov and Fridman From the Sanctions List
The European Union lifted asset freezes and travel bans on Russian businessman Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman, co-founder of one of Russia’s largest conglomerates, on Tuesday. The decision came despite an explicit request from Ukraine to keep the two billionaires listed and followed direct pressure from France, according to three diplomats cited by Reuters.
France told EU partners in private that Azerbaijan had been using the Usmanov case as leverage against Paris over two French citizens detained in Baku. The day after the EU decision, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev pardoned one French citizen who had been accused of espionage; France described the pardon as a “humanitarian act.” Luxembourg then demanded parallel treatment for Fridman, who has filed a $16 billion claim against Luxembourg over his frozen assets.
To secure agreement from the other member states, the package extended sanctions against roughly 3,000 other Russian-linked individuals and entities for an additional three years. Diplomats said most governments effectively had no choice but to accept the French demand in exchange for the wider extension. Latvia initially blocked the measure before agreeing to abstain, while Baltic states voiced the sharpest criticism. Ukraine’s sanctions policy envoy Vladyslav Vlasiuk said he was shocked by the plan.
What the Usmanov-Fridman Delisting Reveals About EU Sanctions Politics
France, Azerbaijan and the Price of a Pardon
France’s push to delist Usmanov appears tied to Baku’s detention of French citizens. Diplomats say Azerbaijan used the sanctions issue as leverage; the pardon on Wednesday suggests the linkage was real. This creates a worrying precedent for the bloc: if one member can trade a listing, other governments may face similar pressure in their own bilateral disputes.
Luxembourg’s Legal Exposure and Fridman’s $16 Billion Claim
Luxembourg’s request was driven by Fridman’s $16 billion legal claim over the freezing of his assets. By supporting the delisting, Luxembourg may reduce its financial and legal exposure, but it also demonstrates that litigation by sanctioned individuals can influence EU sanctions policy. The message to other sanctioned figures is difficult to ignore.
Unanimity, the Baltic Backlash and the Three-Year Trade-Off
EU sanctions decisions require unanimity, which gave France leverage to force the package. Latvia’s initial block and later abstention highlight how dissenting states could be managed rather than persuaded. The extension of sanctions on 3,000 other targets for three years was the price of preserving the broader framework, but the Baltic criticism and Ukraine’s shock show that the reputational damage is real. The next test will be whether similar delisting requests appear.
After the Delisting: What Changes for EU Governments and Compliance Teams
For EU governments and institutions
- Update sanctions lists immediately: Usmanov and Fridman are no longer subject to EU asset freezes and travel bans, while the 3,000 extended listings remain in force for another three years.
- Prepare for future unanimity pressure: the French-Azerbaijan deal shows that bilateral disputes can force delistings; Baltic member states and Ukraine-focused officials should plan objections before packages reach a vote, as Latvia’s abstention shows.
For financial institutions and asset managers
- Review blocked assets linked to Usmanov and Fridman for release procedures under the new EU decision, and verify whether any national measures still apply.
- Assess exposure to similar litigation: Fridman’s $16 billion Luxembourg claim illustrates that frozen assets can generate legal costs, so document decisions and legal bases carefully.
Risk & Opportunity Assessment
| Commercial Risk | Medium | The decision removes asset freezes for Usmanov and Fridman, creating compliance clarity for those specific names; however, it shows that EU listings can be reversed under bilateral and legal pressure, increasing uncertainty for firms holding frozen Russian-linked assets and exposing EU members to claims such as Fridman’s $16 billion lawsuit. |
| Competitive Risk | Low | No direct competitive market shift is described; the impact is primarily political and legal rather than within a specific industry. |
| Regulatory Risk | High | EU sanctions policy has been shown to be vulnerable to member-state bargaining; the unanimous decision process allowed France and Luxembourg to force delistings, and the extension of 3,000 other sanctions for three years is a compensating measure, not a structural fix. |
| Reputation Risk | High | The EU faced sharp criticism from Baltic states and shock from Ukraine for appearing to yield to Azerbaijan-linked pressure and legal threats while Russia continues its war; this undermines the bloc’s stated support for Ukraine and sanctions credibility. |
| Technology Disruption | Low | No technology or industrial innovation dimension is present in this sanctions decision. |
| Commercial Opportunity | Medium | France gained a humanitarian gesture from Azerbaijan and Luxembourg reduced its exposure to Fridman’s $16 billion claim; Usmanov and Fridman regain EU asset and travel rights, which may restore their business and personal access. |
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