Iran Says It Has Struck a Temporary Hormuz Shipping Deal With Oman as US Claims Sovereignty

Iran and Oman Set Temporary Shipping Corridors as the US Doubles Down

On 15 August, Iran announced that it has reached an agreement with Oman on navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, the latest twist in a widening US-Iran standoff over the strategic waterway. Under the arrangement, the two temporary routes that had emerged after an earlier memorandum — one in Omani territorial waters to the south and one in Iranian waters to the north — will both close. Commercial vessels entering and leaving the strait will instead be routed for part of their journey through Iranian territorial waters. The new lanes are temporary and are expected to remain usable for two to four months.

The Iranian announcement came one day after President Trump said the United States would soon “declare the Strait of Hormuz American territory,” adding with a laugh that it was “true.” A White House official later told The Wall Street Journal that Trump had not discussed the remark with senior advisers and was joking. Yet the comment fits a pattern: Trump has previously called for restoring a US blockade, declared the US the strait’s “guardian,” threatened a 20 percent fee on transit, and claimed “100 percent” control of the waterway.

The dispute is not rhetorical. After renewed US airstrikes, Iran announced on 12 July that it was closing the strait, while Washington insisted that the southern lane near Oman remained passable — a claim Iran rejected. Iranian officials responded to the latest US statement by saying the strait is not something that “can be seized by a tweet, an aircraft carrier, an order or a speech.” The confrontation matters far beyond the region because the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important oil-transit chokepoints, and both sides are now asserting effective but incomplete control over its operation.

Why Neither Washington Nor Tehran Can Fully Control the Strait

What the Iran-Oman arrangement actually changes

The new corridor is a concrete shift, not just a diplomatic talking point. By routing some commercial traffic through Iranian territorial waters and closing the southern lane that the United States said it was assisting, Tehran is trying to convert geography into practical control. Oman’s role keeps the channel open without giving Washington a seat in the arrangement; Iran has repeatedly said the talks with Oman had no US participation. But because the lane is explicitly temporary — two to four months — it is a stopgap rather than a lasting settlement.

Trump’s sovereignty claim is political theater with real costs

The White House’s description of Trump’s territory remark as a joke signals that annexation is not a formal policy plan. Still, the repeated statements, the 20 percent transit-fee threat and the assertion of “100 percent” control harden the American position and make a negotiated compromise harder. They also deepen the frustration of Washington’s Gulf partners. A European official described the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani Mecca Common Defense Agreement as a signal that those states are seeking to diversify their security and defense partnerships because, in the official’s words, “the United States is not enough.”

The stalemate is likely to outlast the temporary lanes

Middle East expert Wang Jin and other analysts quoted in the report assess that neither side can actually monopolize the strait. Iran’s leverage comes from geography and its ability to manage vessel traffic; America’s comes from naval power and the ability to blockade Iranian ports from outside the strait. The underlying demands remain incompatible: Washington wants a return to conditions before 28 February, while Iran wants recognition of its dominant role — something the United States has not accepted. Without a major new US military operation, the pattern of escalation and partial de-escalation is expected to continue.

What the Hormuz Impasse Means for Shippers, Traders and Gulf Governments

• Shipping operators and charterers: confirm which authority controls each segment of the temporary corridor before using it, because Iran and the United States disagree on the safety of the southern lane and the new two-to-four-month lanes run partly through Iranian territorial waters.
• Energy buyers and traders: build a near-term supply scenario in which the temporary Iran-Oman corridors expire without a permanent replacement, since the two sides have not accepted each other’s framework and Iran has already closed the strait once during this conflict.
• Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani officials: clarify whether the Mecca Common Defense Agreement will cover maritime security in the Hormuz chokepoint; a European official cited the pact as a sign that Gulf security partners no longer see the United States as sufficient.
• US and Iranian officials: separate the narrow shipping-corridor question from the wider sovereignty dispute to keep temporary commercial passage open, because Iran insists the strait’s opening and closing is solely under Iranian control while Washington demands a return to pre-28 February conditions.