Five Years After Kabul Fell, the Taliban’s Grip Is Stronger Than in the 1990s

This month marks five years since the Taliban retook Kabul, ending two decades of Western-backed government and restoring the movement's Islamic Emirate. The anniversary matters because the group's second stint in power has now lasted exactly as long as its first, from September 1996 to November 2001. In 2001, the regime fell within months of the September 11 attacks. There is no comparable force on the horizon this time.

Unlike the 1990s, the Taliban inherited a different Afghanistan in 2021. After twenty years of elections, universities, a freer press and international scholarships, Afghans were far more connected to the outside world. The movement also entered a different international system: instead of facing a single Western superpower, it can now court Russia, China, Iran and others. Russia has engaged the group most directly, while Iran has handed over the Afghan embassy in Tehran to Taliban representatives.

The armed opposition remains fragmented. The National Resistance Front, led from exile by Ahmad Massoud's son, carries the same baggage of warlordism and past abuses that undermined the Northern Alliance. The Afghanistan Freedom Front and the Afghan United Front likewise operate from outside the country and have not established a coherent political program or unified command. The most visible challenge came on 17 July in Badakhshan, when a local militia briefly seized the district of Yaftal-e Payin before Taliban reinforcements restored control within hours. Days later, the AFF claimed an assault around Zebak, but the episode did not change the regime's hold.

Inside the movement, friction between the clerical leadership in Kandahar and more pragmatic figures in Kabul has not produced an open split. The result is that, five years on, the Taliban control the entire territory and face no credible rival for power.

Why the Current Emirate Is Harder to Dislodge Than the First

A Multipolar Patronage Map Replaces Pax Americana

In the 1990s, the Taliban were largely a Pakistani proxy with no alternative superpower to approach. The current leadership has reversed that dependence. Relations with Islamabad have deteriorated into direct hostilities, including Pakistani strikes on Afghan civilian targets, and the Taliban have moved closer to New Delhi. Iran has adopted a pragmatic posture, and Russia has gone furthest by treating the group as a legitimate government. This is the clearest reason the regime can endure international isolation: diplomatic and economic doors in Moscow, Beijing and Tehran reduce the cost of Western non-recognition.

The Opposition Has Tactics but Not the Machinery of an Insurgency

The July 17 seizure of Yaftal-e Payin and the AFF's claimed operations around Zebak show that armed resistance exists. But scattered attacks are not a serious challenge. The National Resistance Front is commanded remotely from Europe by Ahmad Massoud, whose movement is weighed down by the Northern Alliance's record of warlordism and war crimes. The Afghanistan Freedom Front, led by former army chief of staff Yasin Zia, has military credibility but no political vision. The Afghan United Front's leader, Sami Sadat, fled to the United States and is accused of war crimes. None has a unified command, a coherent program, reliable external backing, or the ability to hold territory—the assets the Taliban themselves had when they rebuilt an insurgency after 2001.

Internal Cohesion Is Deliberate, Not Accidental

The Taliban have not avoided infighting by chance. Leaders who watched factional warfare discredit the anti-Soviet Mujahideen in the 1990s treat solidarity as the foundation of their survival. While tensions persist between the Kandahar-based emir, Hibatullah Akhundzada, and Kabul pragmatists who want international engagement, the movement has so far managed those disputes without an open rupture. That is a meaningful difference from the fractured politics that helped bring down the earlier Afghan state.

The Gender Apartheid Carries an Economic Price

Five years in, the ban on girls' schooling beyond sixth grade affects 2.4 million girls. The distinction between a partial ban and the 1990s total prohibition is superficial: in practice, women have been removed from public life. The longer-term consequence is economic. Educated Afghans who see no future for their daughters are leaving, and that brain drain weakens Afghanistan's capacity for recovery and reconstruction far more than the current armed skirmishes do.

What the Anniversary Means for Diplomats, Donors and Regional Businesses

  • Diplomats weighing engagement should distinguish between the formal Western position and the practical reality: Russia has already moved to treat the Taliban as a legitimate government, Iran has handed over the Afghan embassy in Tehran to Taliban representatives, and the group has hostile relations with Pakistan while courting India. Any Western strategy that ignores this patronage map will overestimate the cost of non-recognition.
  • Investors and logistics operators considering Afghan transit or mineral projects should treat the Badakhshan events of 17 July and the AFF's claimed Zebak assault as local security incidents, not a shift in control. Taliban reinforcements restored control within hours, and the opposition has shown no ability to hold territory.
  • Donors and aid agencies planning education or health programs must price in the ban on girls' schooling beyond sixth grade affecting 2.4 million girls. The restriction is functioning as a total ban and is accelerating the departure of educated Afghans, which will shrink the local skilled workforce for years.
  • Regional governments should treat the next test as whether the NRF, AFF and AUF can hold territory rather than raid it. The Taliban's own post-2001 insurgency succeeded only after securing sanctuary, financing and unity under one leader—none of which the current opposition has shown.