Afghanistan Five Years On: Security Up, Hunger and Rights Down

On 15 August 2021, Taliban forces swept into Kabul and completed a takeover that ended two decades of Western-backed government. Five years later, the country's security picture has changed: Afghans and aid workers say the constant threat of explosions and open warfare has largely disappeared. But that relative calm has not translated into human progress. Afghanistan, home to more than 48 million people, is now in a severe humanitarian crisis, with hunger, climate shocks and restrictions on women's lives defining daily reality.

The scale of deprivation is striking. The UN World Food Programme has warned that undernutrition has reached unprecedented levels, with 47 percent of minors undernourished in the first quarter of 2026. Yet international aid remains drastically short of what the country needs. The Norwegian Refugee Council says only about 42 percent of required humanitarian funds were actually provided last year. Thamindri de Silva, who heads World Vision International's office in Herat, told dpa that Afghanistan is experiencing conflict, famine and natural disaster at the same time—a combination she said is unlike anything she has seen in more than two decades of crisis work.

The pressure is compounded by climate change and migration. Flooding has killed dozens of people twice this year, while prolonged drought has ruined harvests. Since September 2023, nearly 5.9 million Afghans have returned to the country, mainly from Pakistan and Iran, increasing the population by an estimated 10 to 12 percent. More than 90 percent of those returnees live on less than five US dollars a day, according to the UN refugee agency.

Meanwhile, women have been steadily erased from public life. They must be accompanied by a male relative in public and at medical appointments, face strict dress codes and have almost no access to work permits or higher education. In June, protests broke out in Herat after Taliban morality police detained about 30 women for alleged dress-code violations. The restrictions are real, but Afghan observers say their impact is uneven: urban, educated women have lost the most, while some rural women say they have gained physical safety compared with the pre-Taliban years, even as they remain bound by deeply patriarchal structures.

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Taliban Rule: Pragmatists in Kabul, Hardliners in Kandahar and Pressure from Pakistan

Security Has Improved, but Human Development Is Moving Backwards

The central dilemma of Taliban rule is that physical security and human development have moved in opposite directions. A Kabul entrepreneur, Fosan, told dpa that Afghanistan is now "quite safe from explosions and war" but is heading "in a dark direction" on human development. The reason is structural: the Taliban have imposed order through repression and centralised control, but they have not produced the governance, revenue or international legitimacy needed to run basic services. The result is a country that is no longer in active war yet cannot feed large parts of its population.

Women's Public Disappearance Is Uneven—and Deepens Urban Alienation

The tightening of women's rights is not uniform across the country, and that divide matters. Morality police have punished shopkeepers for serving women without an escort, and UN Women reported in February that legislation allows the detention of women or relatives if a woman visits a family home without her husband's permission. A May decree has been interpreted by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan as implicitly allowing child marriage, a characterisation the Taliban reject. Yet in Kabul, women still move alone to some extent, and rural women have experienced a different trade-off: greater protection from attacks, but within a system where gender equality was never close to Western standards. UN Women cites a representative survey showing 52 percent of Afghan women leave their home only twice a month or less, compared with 96 percent of men who go out daily. The psychological damage from these restrictions, the organisation says, is severe.

The Pakistan Border Conflict Is an Overlooked Second Front

Since October 2025, Afghanistan has been in a slow-burn conflict with Pakistan. Islamabad accuses the Taliban of sheltering militants who attack inside Pakistan; Kabul denies it. The fighting has mostly stayed in the mountainous border region, but Pakistan has also carried out airstrikes on Kabul and Kandahar. The UN has documented 499 Afghan civilians killed in Pakistani attacks since October last year. For the Taliban, this is more than a security nuisance: it complicates their claim to have brought stability, forces resources toward the eastern border and further isolates the country at a time when aid and diplomatic engagement are already limited.

The Taliban Are Not a Monolith: Kabul vs Kandahar

One of the most consequential unknowns is the direction of Taliban policy. The BBC reports a pragmatic faction in Kabul that favours economic stability, external opening and improved access to education for girls and women. Against that stands a hardline faction around Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada in Kandahar, which is linked to the short-lived internet shutdown implemented last year. Clashes with opposition groups in the north are also being reported, but they are difficult to verify because reporting from the region is heavily restricted. The result is that after five years it is still not possible to say whether a serious, organised resistance to Taliban rule is emerging—or whether the main struggle is inside the movement itself.

What Comes Next for Afghanistan, Donors and Regional Governments

  • For donors and aid agencies: The WFP says 47 percent of Afghan minors were undernourished in the first quarter of 2026, while the Norwegian Refugee Council says only about 42 percent of required humanitarian funds were provided last year. The near-5.9 million returnee inflow since September 2023 adds a further 10–12 percent population burden that current funding levels cannot absorb.
  • For governments assessing women's rights policy: UN Women documents that 52 percent of Afghan women leave home at most twice a month, and a February legal text allows detention of women or relatives over household movement without a husband's permission. Policy responses should therefore target specific Taliban decrees on education, work permits and child marriage, rather than treating Taliban assurances as sufficient.
  • For regional governments: Pakistan's conflict with the Taliban has escalated since October 2025, with 499 Afghan civilian deaths documented by the UN. Cross-border strikes on Kabul and Kandahar show the dispute is not confined to the frontier and remains a live source of regional instability.
  • For Afghan civil society and exiled opposition: The visible split between Kabul's pragmatist faction and the Kandahar hardliners—including the past internet shutdown—suggests policy reversals are possible but fragile. Any domestic or international engagement should be tied to verifiable changes in access to education, work and movement, not to stated intentions alone.