Key Points
- Russian oligarch superyachts seized under EU sanctions — including the 143-metre 'A' in Trieste and the 156-metre 'Dilbar' near Bremen — are costing taxpayers and shipyards tens of thousands of euros per day in maintenance, berthing and insurance.
- Complex international trust structures have made it legally difficult to establish true ownership, with courts in Italy and Germany delivering mixed rulings on whether the yachts can remain frozen.
- The cases expose a structural weakness in sanctions enforcement: states must front the costs of maintaining seized luxury assets with no guarantee of recovery, while shipyards like Lürssen bear upkeep obligations that may never be reimbursed.
How Two Frozen Superyachts Became a Multimillion-Euro Problem for Italy and Germany
Two of the world's largest superyachts, seized under EU sanctions against Russia, have become a costly logistical and legal burden for Italy and Germany. The 143-metre sailing yacht 'A', owned by Russian oligarch Andrej Melnitschenko, has been anchored in the port of Trieste since 2022. According to Trieste's mayor, Roberto Dipiazza, maintaining the vessel costs Italian taxpayers up to €30,000 per day — a cumulative bill exceeding €40 million. The yacht requires a 20-person crew, berthing fees, insurance, fuel for generators and regular maintenance, even though it never leaves the dock.
In Germany, the 156-metre megayacht 'Dilbar' — valued at €600 million — sits in a floating dock at the Lürssen shipyard near Bremen. Its upkeep is estimated at €50,000 per day, or more than €18 million annually. Until recently, the shipyard bore these costs under its duty of care. But in June 2026, the Frankfurt Administrative Court ruled that authorities had failed to prove that Alischer Usmanow or his sanctioned sister controlled the owning trust, meaning the yacht could no longer be treated as a frozen economic resource under EU sanctions. Lürssen now has the right to bill the trust or seek state compensation, though US sanctions and ongoing legal appeals delay any resolution.
The legal complexity stems from opaque ownership structures. The yacht 'A' is officially held by a Bermuda-based company controlled by a trust, and Melnitschenko's lawyers argued that this structure means he is no longer the legal owner. The European Court of Justice rejected that argument, allowing the freeze to stand, but the main case continues before an Italian administrative court. Meanwhile, the costs keep mounting, and politicians like Mayor Dipiazza are frustrated by the lack of a clear exit.
At a Glance
| Main Companies | Nobiskrug, German Naval Yards, Lürssen-Werft German shipyards that built or maintain the seized yachts; Lürssen currently bears upkeep costs for the Dilbar. |
| Key Individuals | Andrej Melnitschenko, Alischer Usmanow Russian oligarch linked to yacht 'A'; Usmanow was initially linked to Dilbar but a Frankfurt court found no proof of ownership. |
| Key Locations | Trieste (Italy), Bremen (Germany) Ports where the yachts are held; Trieste's mayor says the 'A' costs up to €30,000 per day. |
| Key Financial Figure | €30,000/day (yacht 'A'); €50,000/day (Dilbar) Estimated daily maintenance costs; cumulative costs for 'A' exceed €40 million since 2022. |
| Key Regulation | EU sanctions against Russia Legal framework under which the yachts were frozen; Italy's PM Meloni calls sanctions the best deterrent. |
| Key Legal Body | European Court of Justice; Frankfurt Administrative Court ECJ upheld the freeze on 'A'; Frankfurt court ruled Dilbar no longer a frozen economic resource. |
| Key Term | Trust structure (Bermuda-based) Ownership vehicle used to hold the yachts; lawyers argue it shields oligarchs from direct ownership claims. |
| Key Date | 2022 (seizures); June 2026 (Frankfurt ruling) Yachts frozen after Russia's invasion of Ukraine; German court ruling opened path for Lürssen to bill the trust. |
Where the Sides Stand
Italian and German authorities / EU sanctions regime
Position: Sanctions must be maintained as a deterrent against Russian aggression; seized assets should remain frozen regardless of upkeep costs.
Role in the story: Enforcing the freeze and fronting maintenance costs through state agencies like Agenzia del demanio.
Motivation: Political commitment to Ukraine and pressure to demonstrate sanctions are effective.
Oligarchs' legal teams and affected shipyards
Position: The freeze is legally flawed because trust structures mean the oligarchs are not the legal owners; costs should be borne by the state or the trust, not shipyards.
Role in the story: Challenging sanctions in court and seeking reimbursement or release of the yachts.
Motivation: Financial interest in avoiding millions in upkeep costs and recovering valuable assets.
Trust Structures, Legal Gridlock and the Real Cost of Sanctions Enforcement
Why Trust Structures Are Sanctions' Achilles' Heel
Both cases hinge on the same legal problem: proving who really owns a superyacht when it is held through layered international trusts. The 'A' is formally owned by a Bermuda company controlled by a trust; Melnitschenko's lawyers used that to argue the freeze was illegal. The ECJ disagreed, but the Frankfurt court accepted a similar argument for the 'Dilbar', ruling that German authorities had not proven Usmanow or his sister controlled the owning trust. This inconsistency across EU jurisdictions creates uncertainty for enforcement agencies and opens the door for further legal challenges. For context, the EU's sanctions framework relies on member states to identify and freeze assets, but it does not provide a harmonised mechanism for piercing complex ownership structures — a gap that oligarchs' advisers have exploited since 2022.
The Shipyards Caught in the Middle
Lürssen, one of Germany's most prestigious yacht builders, has been forced to maintain the 'Dilbar' for years without compensation. The June 2026 ruling gives it a legal path to recover costs, but the trust's ownership is disputed and US sanctions remain in place, meaning any payment or release could still be blocked. For Lürssen, this is both a financial drain and a reputational risk: it is stuck caring for an asset it cannot sell, move or hand over. Other German shipyards, including Nobiskrug and German Naval Yards, built the 'A' but are not currently responsible for its upkeep — a reminder that the burden falls unevenly across the industry.
Political Pressure vs. Legal Reality
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni continues to support sanctions as 'our best deterrent', warning against any easing. But local politicians like Trieste's mayor are openly frustrated, calling the situation unsustainable and saying the owner is unlikely to ever reclaim the yacht because buying a new one would be cheaper than repaying the accumulated costs. This tension between national political commitment and local financial pain is likely to intensify if more seized assets remain frozen for years. The EU has no central fund for maintaining confiscated assets, so the costs fall on member states, port authorities and sometimes private companies — a politically awkward outcome that could erode public support for sanctions over time.
What Happens Next
Short term (0–6 months): The 'A' remains in Trieste pending the Italian administrative court's main ruling; the 'Dilbar' stays in Bremen as appeals and US sanctions block its release. Medium term (6–24 months): If courts continue to question ownership, more seized assets could be unfrozen or returned, forcing states to absorb sunk costs. Long term (2–5 years): The EU may face pressure to create a centralised asset-management framework or risk seeing sanctions enforcement undermined by legal and financial attrition.
What the Yacht Seizures Mean for Governments, Shipyards and Sanctions Policy
The most important insight: Seizing oligarch assets is easy; holding them legally and financially is not — and the bill is landing on European taxpayers and private shipyards.
For government agencies and policymakers, the cases of the 'A' and 'Dilbar' highlight the need for a clearer EU-wide mechanism to manage frozen assets, including who pays for upkeep and how ownership disputes are resolved. Without it, enforcement will remain patchy and expensive.
- For national authorities: Review existing seizure protocols to ensure ownership evidence is robust enough to withstand court challenges. The Frankfurt ruling shows that failing to prove control over a trust can unravel a freeze.
- For shipyards and marine service providers: Clarify contractual rights and insurance coverage for vessels held under sanctions. Lürssen's experience shows that upkeep obligations can run into tens of millions before any reimbursement is possible.
- For EU policymakers: Consider a centralised fund or framework for maintaining seized assets, similar to proposals discussed for frozen Russian central bank reserves. Without it, member states will continue to bear uneven costs.
Metrics to watch: The Italian administrative court's ruling on the 'A'; any US decision to lift or maintain sanctions on the 'Dilbar'; and whether the EU proposes a new asset-management regulation in 2027.
Risk & Opportunity Assessment
| Commercial Risk | Medium | Shipyards like Lürssen face ongoing maintenance costs without guaranteed reimbursement; other marine service providers may be reluctant to accept sanctioned vessels. |
| Competitive Risk | Low | The story is about sanctions enforcement, not market competition; no direct competitive shifts are evident. |
| Regulatory Risk | High | Inconsistent court rulings across EU member states create legal uncertainty for sanctions enforcement and asset freezes. |
| Reputation Risk | Medium | Prolonged, costly seizures could erode public support for sanctions if taxpayers see no clear benefit or resolution. |
| Technology Disruption | Low | No technological disruption is involved; the issue is legal and financial. |
| Commercial Opportunity | Low | Limited commercial opportunity; the main financial flow is cost recovery, not new business. |
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