Venezuela’s Oil Recovery Is Real, but U.S.-Controlled Revenue Keeps It Opaque

A Recovery Built on Sanctions Relief—and a U.S.-Controlled Account

Venezuela’s oil sector is climbing back from a two-decade collapse. Average crude production reached 1.2 million barrels per day between April and May 2026, compared with about 1 million barrels per day in 2025 and roughly 600,000 barrels per day in 2020, when the industry was at its lowest point in decades. According to Víctor José Morales, president of the oil chamber in Anzoátegui state, 2026 could be the best year for Venezuelan oil in 10 to 13 years.

The rebound follows a shift in U.S. policy toward Caracas. Washington eased some sanctions early in the year and allowed six major international energy companies to return: Chevron, BP, Shell, ENI, Repsol and Maurel & Prom. Oil exports generated around $9 billion last year, and Morales says that figure had already been exceeded by mid-2026.

But the money trail is far less straightforward than the production numbers. Former U.S. President Donald Trump has claimed the United States collected about $13 billion from Venezuelan oil. Analysts counter that the funds do not go directly into the U.S. budget. Instead, proceeds are deposited into a special account supervised by the U.S. Treasury, originally opened in Dubai, which releases money to the Venezuelan government only after individual expenses are reviewed and approved.

Economists and former PDVSA officials warn that Caracas does not freely control those resources. Francisco Monaldi of Rice University’s Baker Institute says it is unclear how much has been paid in or out, and he does not rule out that part of the revenue ended up with people close to Trump or with allies of Venezuelan authorities. Meanwhile, communities in oil regions still face power cuts, water shortages and oil spills, while the country remains far below its late-1990s production of about 3.4 million barrels per day.

Why Venezuela’s Oil Comeback Still Leaves Analysts Uneasy

Sanctions Relief Brought the Majors Back—but Not New Megadeals

The return of Chevron, BP, Shell, ENI, Repsol and Maurel & Prom is the clearest sign of Washington’s limited re-engagement. Yet Axios reported in early August that no new large oil deal between American companies and Venezuela had been concluded in 2026. The message is that the U.S. is opening the Venezuelan market cautiously, not resetting it.

The U.S. Treasury Account Is a Transparency Black Box

The special Treasury-supervised account, originally opened in Dubai, sits between Venezuela’s oil revenue and its government. José Toro Hardy, an economist and former PDVSA director, says Caracas does not dispose of the money freely. Monaldi describes the arrangement as unacceptable because neither total deposits nor disbursements are publicly known. The gap between the amount returned to Venezuela and the amount that should be in the account is, in his view, obvious.

Venezuela Needs $100–150 Billion, and It Cannot Self-Finance

Hardy estimates that returning to late-1990s output of about 3.4 million barrels per day would require $100 billion to $150 billion in new investment, plus another $15 billion to $20 billion to rebuild the power grid. The state does not have that capital, so private investors would have to supply it. So far, they are not doing so at scale.

A New Hydrocarbon Law Adds Legal Risk

Former PDVSA leaders argue the new hydrocarbons law gives the government excessive power over taxation and offers too little legal protection to foreign investors. That directly undermines the predictability that long-cycle oil investment requires, even as production recovers.

Lake Maracaibo Shows the Recovery Is Not Reaching Communities

The cities around Lake Maracaibo, the historic cradle of Venezuelan oil, still suffer frequent blackouts, drinking-water interruptions and poor infrastructure. Environmental groups have proposed directing 5 percent of oil revenue to lake remediation, but the proposal has not been accepted. For many analysts, this gap between rising production and stagnant living standards is the core paradox of the recovery.

The Practical Stakes for Energy Companies and Their Investors

• Energy company boards: Treat Venezuela exposure as a cash-flow play governed by U.S. Treasury disbursement approvals, not as conventional balance-sheet revenue. The special account process keeps ultimate control in Washington.
• Investors in Chevron, BP, Shell, ENI, Repsol or Maurel & Prom: Test whether Venezuelan cash can actually be repatriated under the current license terms before assigning full value to those operations.
• Deal teams: Factor in the new hydrocarbons law’s tax-setting powers and limited legal protections; these are the stated reasons no new large U.S.–Venezuela oil deal has been signed in 2026.
• Long-horizon investors: Use $100–150 billion of required sector investment and $15–20 billion of grid repair as a realistic capex benchmark for any claim that Venezuela can return to late-1990s output.
• ESG and community relations teams: Include the proposed 5 percent of oil revenue for Lake Maracaibo remediation in negotiations with operators; without visible local benefits, the recovery will keep losing social license.