Putin Orders Russian Navy to Mirror Western Seizures of Merchant Ships

Putin's Reciprocal Seizure Order and the Pacific Fleet Drills

President Vladimir Putin said on 12 August that Russia would respond symmetrically to seizures of Russian merchant ships in international waters by unfriendly states. Speaking on the missile cruiser Varyag at the closing day of Pacific Fleet exercises, he said the response would not be limited to waters where attacks were planned. Previous Western actions had already taken place in the Baltic, North and Mediterranean Seas, but Moscow could also act in areas it considered expedient, including the Pacific Fleet zone of responsibility.

Putin accused a number of Western states of trying to restrict Russian shipping in violation of international law and of moving toward the seizure and sale of Russian property. He called that piracy and robbery. At the same time, he said Moscow remained open to compromise with Western governments. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Viktor Liina reported that the military-political situation in the Asia-Pacific was tense and worsening, and that Western states were actively using ships under third-country flags.

According to Russian naval command figures, 1,001 vessels passed through Russia's exclusive economic zone along the South Kuril chain between 24 April and 6 August, more than half under flags of unfriendly states. The Pacific Fleet drills ran from 4 to 12 August in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, involving about 60 surface ships, submarines and support vessels, around 30 aircraft and more than 13,000 service personnel.

Lawyer Sergey Glendin of BGP Litigation said Russia could, by reciprocity, detain, inspect and confiscate cargo from vessels of unfriendly states. He said this could create a new legal custom. He pointed to existing Russian legal instruments, including Federal Law 281 on special economic measures, Federal Law 390 on security and Federal Law 127 on countermeasures against unfriendly actions of foreign states. A law that took effect this summer also allows the president to use the Russian army outside Russia's territory to protect Russian citizens. Glendin said a presidential decree could still specify which states would be subject to vessel inspections and cargo confiscation in Russian territorial waters or its exclusive economic zone.

The Escalation Calculus: Shadow Fleets, Sanctions and Ocean Trade

A Tit-for-Tat Logic with a Legal Toolkit

The Russian position is not simply rhetorical. By publicly ordering mirror measures, Moscow is laying groundwork for reciprocal state practice. Glendin's argument is that detentions and confiscations repeated over time can harden into a new legal custom. The legal instruments he cites already exist, but the operational procedures are not yet fully codified. A future decree could name states and define powers for inspection, detention and conversion of foreign cargo into Russian state property. Western governments will almost certainly reject the legality of such measures, especially outside zones where Russia has clear jurisdiction.

Where Russian Interception Is Real, and Where It Is Limited

Expert Maksim Shepovalenko of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies said Russia's Pacific Fleet has the ability to intercept vessels from unfriendly states near the Kuril chain or in the Sea of Japan. But he cautioned that Russia needs a clear plan for what to do after taking control of a vessel and how to handle further escalation. Andrey Kortunov of the Valdai Club argued that the main cargo flow in the Pacific runs between China and Europe, and stopping ships with Chinese goods would be self-defeating. He therefore sees Russia's practical ability to disrupt European shipping in the Pacific as limited, even if the political signal is strong.

How Western Seizures and Russian Countermeasures Reinforce Each Other

The cycle is now explicit. The European Union's 21st sanctions package, approved on 23 July, allows member states to sell Russian oil and other goods taken from vessels attempting to bypass restrictions. Euractiv quoted an unnamed European official saying such seizures happen often and that the cargoes can be very valuable, with Russian grain also possible to confiscate. France, Italy and Belgium have all reported detaining suspected Russian shadow tankers in the Mediterranean, Atlantic and North Sea this year. Russia calls these acts piracy and now says it will treat Western seizures the same way. For shipping operators and cargo owners, the consequence is a twin legal and physical risk: Western enforcement on one side and potential Russian counter-seizure on the other.

Practical Implications for Shipping, Cargo and Policy Teams

For corporate teams exposed to sanctioned cargo, Russian waters or high-risk shipping lanes, the announcement creates specific planning points.

• Shipping operators with vessels or cargo crossing the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk or the Kuril exclusive economic zone should reassess flag state, cargo documentation and AIS practices. Russia has explicitly highlighted the use of third-country flags as a problem.
• Cargo owners and insurers with exposure to Russian-linked energy or grain should review seizure and confiscation cover. EU member states can already sell seized Russian oil and goods under the 21st sanctions package, and Russia is preparing reciprocal confiscation powers.
• Legal and compliance teams should track the possible Russian decree listing states subject to inspection and confiscation, and the relevant laws cited by Glendin: 281-FZ, 390-FZ and 127-FZ.
• Operators routing China-Europe cargo should note that Russia has little incentive to target Chinese goods, but vessels flagged in unfriendly states or carrying sanctioned cargo face the highest counter-seizure risk.
• Risk managers should prepare for a possible shift toward naval convoying. Kortunov's scenario may not become widespread, but any move to escort merchant ships would raise war-risk premiums and delay transits.