Why Russia Is Handing Its Syrian Bases to Damascus
Russia and Syria signed a memorandum on 9 August to reorganise Russian military facilities at the Hmeimim airbase and the Tartus naval base. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on 11 August that the objects are being transferred to Syrian civilian control and converted into joint Russian-Syrian training centres. The document also provides for civilian use of Hmeimim airport and a commercial berth in Tartus port.
The Syrian foreign ministry said the agreement took more than a year and a half of intensive talks and called it “the most significant event since the start of negotiations”. In addition, Moscow and Damascus agreed to restart the Russian House in Damascus, which will focus on education cooperation. Russia’s cooperation agency said more than 4,500 Syrians have applied to study at Russian universities since the beginning of the year.
The bases had been Moscow’s main outpost in the eastern Mediterranean, used to support the Assad government during the civil war and to launch airstrikes against armed opposition positions. Their future became uncertain after Bashar al-Assad was overthrown and fled to Moscow in December 2024. A source familiar with the talks told Vedomosti that Moscow had already handed control of the Hmeimim runway to the new Syrian administration before the memorandum, under a temporary arrangement that allowed Russia to save face.
The memorandum coincided with the 11 August death sentences handed down in Damascus against Assad, his brother Maher and cousin Atef Najib. Experts interviewed by Vedomosti said the base agreement and the court verdict are not part of a single deal, but together show Damascus cooperating with Moscow while treating the former ruling family as irreconcilable.
What the Hmeimim–Tartus Compromise Changes for Both Sides
What Russia formally keeps — and what it gives up
The memorandum does not expressly remove Russian forces, but it changes the legal basis of their presence. By converting the facilities into joint training centres under Syrian civilian control, Moscow retains a formal foothold while losing the exclusive use it previously enjoyed. IMEMO senior researcher Nikolay Sukhov cautions that calling the memorandum a guarantee that the bases will remain is premature: the main open question is which military and logistical capabilities Russia will retain once the status of the objects changes.
Damascus’s incentive to keep Moscow close
The new Syrian leadership has not demanded a full Russian withdrawal, according to Sukhov, because it still benefits from Russian military training, technical assistance and foreign-policy room for manoeuvre. The Vedomosti source said the new government is interested in Russian grain and fuel supplies. The risk for Moscow is explicit: once Damascus finds alternative suppliers, it could close the joint training centres and end Russian presence in Syria.
This is a short-term dependency, not a durable guarantee. Moscow is therefore trading exclusive military control for a narrower, conditional role that depends on Syria’s economic needs.
The Mediterranean logistics test
RIAC expert Kirill Semenov argues that the transfer of the Hmeimim runway will not block transport links for Russia’s global military presence, and that the Russian Navy will be able to berth at the Tartus pier as before. In return, the new Syrian army could potentially use Russian specialists to repair Soviet- and Russian-made equipment and to train personnel. Semenov notes this resembles US basing arrangements in the Middle East, where American forces use facilities only in coordination with local militaries.
But that comparison also underlines the change: Russia’s previous autonomy at Tartus and Hmeimim is being replaced by a negotiated, conditional access arrangement.
Where the Assad verdict fits
Sukhov says the death sentences against Assad family members and the memorandum are not linked as a single transaction. The symbolic logic is still important: the trial began with events in Deraa, where the 2011 protest movement started, and the verdict helps the new elite legitimise its authority. At the same time, Damascus is separating its cooperation with Moscow from its treatment of the former president, while Moscow is trying to shift relations from a personal to an institutional basis.
The Concrete Tests Facing the Russia–Syria Arrangement
For regional analysts and businesses with a stake in Syria’s ports, education or reconstruction, four concrete developments from this story are the useful markers.
- Port and logistics: the Tartus commercial berth is now designated for civilian use, but no operational terms, fees or timetable have been published; any commercial opportunity depends on the next Syrian regulations, not on this memorandum alone.
- Education cooperation: the announced reopening of the Russian House in Damascus and the reported 4,500 Syrian university applications are the clearest near-term channel for Russian institutions; specifics will come from Rossotrudnichestvo.
- Russian force projection: the decisive variable is not the memorandum but Syria’s supply dependence. The source says once Damascus replaces Russian grain and fuel, the training centres could be closed and Russian presence wound down.
- Legal timeline: the 11 August death sentences are separate from the base agreement, but the trial and verdict are part of the new administration’s domestic legitimacy project; further proceedings against former officials may run in parallel.
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